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Boycott them! No, boycott this! Do choice overload and small-agent rationalization
inhibit the signing of anti-consumption petitions?
Abstract
The Internet and social media have increased the number of organizations and
individuals asking consumers to sign petitions against transgressing brands. This raises a
question as to whether such increases in requests to sign a petition to support a boycott
positively or negatively impact on consumer willingness to enact anti-consumption. Via
experiments, this study investigates the effect that choice overload has on consumers signing
a petition in support of a boycott call. The findings establish that individuals who need to
make a choice from numerous boycott calls (i.e., large choice-sets) are less likely to sign a
petition to support a boycott than individuals making a similar choice from a small number of
boycott calls (i.e., small choice-sets). The study further introduces a mediator that explains
this effect. Compared with individuals facing a small choice-set, those facing numerous
options are more likely to experience the small-agent rationalization, and thus, are less likely
to sign the petition to support a boycott. The small-agent rationalization relates to one’s
acceptance of inequity in the world as well as perceptions of their own powerlessness. The
study establishes the role of choice overload in boycott literature and empirically tests smallagent rationalization as the process mechanism. Theoretical, practical, and policy
implications are discussed.
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Introduction
In 2014, a journalist from Delhi was shocked at the rape of a 25-year-old woman by
an Uber driver, so she started a petition on Change.org demanding the company mandate a 7year background check of all drivers in India as it does in the US (Change.org, 2016). The
petition was successful with 63,593 supporters (Change.org, n.d.-a). As a response, Uber
made prompt changes prioritizing and committing to the safety of their customers by
employing background checks, document verification, and police re-verification.
The above example is one of many successful stories about consumer activists using
petition sites like Change.org to challenge firms, organizations, and even governments. A
browse on the Internet and a visit to various social media outlets reveal numerous calls for
boycotts or petition requests against transgressive brands. Indeed, copious requests to support
boycott calls appear in people’s Facebook newsfeed every day. Thanks to social media,
thousands of people or groups look for online support of their calls, and thousands of people
sign these petitions, which they then share on social media. Activists utilize technology for
social change, and e-petitions offer great potential. E-petitions are widely used with hundreds
of thousands of online petitions created worldwide each year with millions of signatures
supporting various causes (Wright, 2016), thanks to websites such as Change.org that provide
free platforms hosting campaigns with the mission of “empower[ing] people everywhere to
create change they want to see,” claiming to have over 240 million passionate members
(Change.org, n.d.-b). Popular topics of e-petitions range from issues of human rights,
economics, education, health, and sustainable food, to criminal justice, animal rights, and
environmental protection. The phenomenon of e-petitions that are interactive and involving
public mobilization and collective actions via cooperation with others (Sheppard, 2015),
sometimes generated by new social ties, can be referred to as ethical consumption
empowerment (Forno & Graziano, 2014). The augmentation of individual consumption or
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anti-consumption decisions of ethical consumers give rise to social change, created
collectively as an outcome of consumer empowerment in the marketplace (Papaoikonomou &
Alarcón, 2017).
Requests for “signing a petition” to support a boycott call are very common for
consumers on social media. Whilst such demands are increasingly popping up in many
online, digital, and interactive environments, we wonder whether the increasing number of
announcements might decrease their effectiveness. Research confirms that providing
consumers with too many product offerings causes choice overload effects in the retail
environment (e.g., see Chernev, Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2015 for a discussion; Lee & Lee,
2004). Accordingly, we argue in this current research that similar overload effects may be
experienced with increased demand for signing e-petitions. Therefore, it is reasonable to
expect that the same negative effects of choice overload may also emerge when consumers
need to select a transgressive brand to boycott in an online environment.
Signing an online petition to support a boycott against a transgressive brand may be
less taxing for consumers than partaking in actual boycotts organized by boycott organizers.
Even though cost of boycotting is a predictor of boycott participation (Sen, Gürhan-Canli, &
Morwitz, 2001), asking customers to sign an e-petition remains important for two reasons.
First, even when consumers do not actually boycott, by simply signing a petition they show
their support, and thus, provide word-of-mouth about the significance of the boycott case
(Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, Walsh, & Gremler, 2004). Such support is important to increase
boycott participation. Second, consumers who publicly announce that they support a boycott
will be more likely to follow their promise and participate in the actual boycott (Garrett,
1987). Although online actions such as signing a petition may help people feel good about
themselves; thus, potentially, decreasing the need for further actions with tangible impacts
(Morozov, 2012; Skoric, 2012), there is still evidence that these low-effort acts encourage
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further-involved actions (e.g., volunteering, engaging in conscious consumption, and
donation; Lee & Hsieh, 2013) as well as traditional activist behaviors such as participating in
social movements (Parigi & Gong, 2014). Clearly, social-networking sites and
communication tools (e.g., Facebook or Twitter) allow individuals to connect to each other
easily, encouraging them to make significant impacts collectively in these online spaces
(Resnick, 2002; Shirky, 2011). Although calls for online audiences to sign petitions in
support of a boycott have become very popular with the rise in social media usage; anticonsumption research has not yet introduced this important tool (as an outcome variable) to
boycott studies. Given that signing petitions may increase boycott participation, and thus, the
chances of boycott success, it is worthwhile to introduce “petition signing” as a new way to
measure boycott likelihood, and thus, allow anti-consumption scholars to benefit from the
strength of this popular method of protest.
We argue that numerous “sign a petition” requests on social media may create similar
choice overload effects as being exposed to too many products. Accordingly, we explore the
effect of choice overload on consumers signing a petition in support of a boycott.
Contributing to both boycott and choice overload literature, this study is the first to introduce
the notion that many requests to sign a boycott petition against transgressive brands may
inhibit anti-consumption. Importantly, this study establishes the construct of “small-agent
rationalization” (SAR) via a scale, which enhances our understanding of the underlying
mechanism that explains the effect of large choice-sets on consumers’ likelihood to support
boycotts.
Prior literature already supports the idea that individuals perceive themselves as
“small” when they confront a large firm, which makes them assess an individual act of
protest as personally costly (Klein, Smith, & John, 2004). This present research further
proposes that SAR is a thought process that occurs when people begin accepting inequity in
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the world as a common occurrence, and that they alone at the “micro-level” are incapable of
enacting change within a “macro-level” system (such as a globalized marketplace). The study
then discusses the components of SAR and provide empirical evidence for its effect. Finally,
the study concludes with managerial and policy implications based on research findings.

Boycott calls, petition signing, and exposure to many choices
Consumer protests against companies and brands comprise several attitudes and actions,
ranging from opposition, such as boycotts, to supporting, such as buycotts (Ettenson, Smith,
Klein, & John, 2006; Hoffmann, Balderjahn, Seegebarth, Mai, & Peyer, 2018) and carrotmobs (Hoffmann & Hutter, 2012). With the ubiquitous presence of the Internet and social
media, consumers are increasingly asked to participate in protests, requiring them to sign
petitions against transgressing organizations. Such requests require them not only to
complain about the company to wider audiences but also sometimes publicly announce a
boycott promise against transgressive brands. The term transgressive brand refers to a brand
that violates its relationship with its consumers and breaches some important (clear or subtle)
norms (Aaker, Fournier, & Brasel, 2004; Humphreys & Thompson, 2014).
Boycotts are conditional acts of anti-consumption (Yuksel, 2013; Yuksel & Mryteza,
2009) where consumers depart from a relationship with an organization or a transgressive
brand that they disapprove of, due to some form of misconduct. Boycott practice involves
stopping or limiting consumption with the transgressing company or brand (Friedman, 1999;
Yuksel & Mryteza, 2009). However, unlike some acts of anti-consumption, which may be
incurable (Lee, Motion, & Conroy, 2009), boycotts provide an assurance of relationship rebuilding once some specified conditions have been met by the company (Hirschman, 1970).
A petition is a document signed by numerous people, announcing a demand that
requires a corporation or public entity to take action to remedy a transgression. Petitions
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signed online have become common practice, used in combination with social media, which
lead targeted consumers to the petition website (Antonetti & Manika, 2017). Online petitions
or e-petitions, which usually focus on a single issue or goal, have increased participation of
citizens who have previously been inattentive in protesting company actions or government
policies that they disapprove (Sheppard, 2015). Evidently, e-petitions owe their popularity to
the recent emergence of online petition websites, such as Change.org, which asks their targets
to start a petition every day.
When consumers are exposed to many products or services they may experience
negative choice overload effects, leading to regret, dissatisfaction, deferring a choice, and/or
rejecting choice altogether, which may even result in no purchases being made (Chernev et
al., 2015; Thai & Yuksel, 2017). This is because when faced with numerous options,
consumers need to make trade-offs or comparisons among alternatives, which may all be
equally attractive. Thus, a choice process involving many options is sometimes harder and
more agonizing, resulting in greater conflict than a decision involving only a few options
(Xu, Jiang, & Dhar, 2013). One of the most important reasons of such frustration may be the
fact that consumers equally like the majority of options available and/or find alternatives so
similar to each other that they feel unable to select the best option.
Likewise, we argue that individuals who are exposed to many boycott calls (all asking
for their signatures to not only show support for the petition but also, in most cases, to enact a
boycott) may also feel similarly overwhelmed, given that most of the issues presented may
seem equally important and worth supporting. But, individuals have a restricted amount of
physical, cognitive, and emotional resources (Drolet & Luce, 2004). Thus, the cost of acting
on all or many of those similarly important calls may seem so high that it becomes
impossible to act upon all the boycott calls. Thus, individuals called for boycotting may
perceive the pressure to select one or just a few calls to support. The necessity to choose one
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or only a few calls out of many is where the choice overload effect becomes salient. An
environment with abundant choices, together with an inevitable pressure to select one or two
calls, may prevent potential supporters from making any choice, as they cannot equitably
decide which call to support. Thus, individuals presented with numerous significant boycott
calls may be reluctant to do so, and thus, may end up signing no petition. In contrast, being
exposed to a limited amount of boycott calls that require support may enhance choicemaking, since, in such cases, individuals have more temporal and cognitive resources, face
fewer personal costs, and thus, may find it easier to make decisions. Thus,
H1: Individuals exposed to many boycott calls are less likely to sign a petition to
support a boycott than individuals exposed to a few boycott calls.

Small-agent rationalization
Factors predicting boycott participation include one’s desire to make a difference,
need for self-enhancement, perceived effectiveness of the boycott (John & Klein, 2003), the
cost of the boycott to the boycotter caused by restricted consumption, and finally, several
consumer counterarguments (Hoffmann, 2013; Klein et al., 2004; Lasarov, Mai, de Frutos,
Egea, & Hoffmann, 2019; Yuksel, 2013). Counterarguments may stem from doubts about the
existence or exaggeration of the accusation itself or its effects (Yuksel, 2013), which may
reflect biased assimilations provoked by the media, politics, and so forth (Ahluwalia, 2000),
or from doubts about the calling party, or the individual’s denial for being responsible to act
upon the accusation and their effects (Thompson & Barton, 1994).
Counterarguments may be initiated by non-participants to rationalize their in-action
(Hoffmann, 2013; Klein et al., 2004; Yuksel, 2013). When the boycott call is perceived as
valid and legitimate but requires high sacrifices or is hard to follow, consumers usually strive
to find some reasonable counterarguments so that they can reduce the extent to which they
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feel guilty or obliged (Lasarov et al., 2019) to boycott, particularly if they feel boycotting to
be the ethical action to conduct. Such counterarguments fall into the category of justifications
consumers develop in response to persuasive messages (Fransen, Verlegh, Kirmani, & Smit,
2015) that they find fair but are not willing to follow.
These justified counterarguments find support in the literature that explains the ethical
purchase gap (Chatzidakis & Lee, 2013; Chatzidakis, Hibbert, & Smith, 2007) and motivated
reasoning (Bhattacharjee, Berman, & Reed, 2012; Kunda, 1990; Tsang, 2002). Neutralization
techniques also help consumers legitimize inconsistent actions with norms and attitudes
(Gruber & Schlegelmilch, 2014). For example, small-agent phenomenon falls into the
category of denial of responsibility under neutralization techniques, where people convince
themselves that they are not personally responsible for any breach of social norms as this was
caused by external factors outside their control (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Perceived low selfefficacy may make a person believe that s/he has no control over external events, and thus,
s/he cannot do anything about the transgression as an individual (Ajzen, 2002; Gifford,
2011). Thus, the degree of perceived behavioral control regarding the cause or the the
outcome of a situation (Ajzen, 1991) might explain why people may show a positive attitude
to a boycott call and agree with the importance of supporting it yet then remain inactive.
Campbell (1963) attributes this inconsistency between an attitude and behavior to the cost of
that specific behavior. Thus, an action is the function of the degree and magnitude of an
attitude and the cost of the subsequent action (Kaiser, Byrka, & Hartig, 2010).
In line with the literature discussed and the cost-benefit analysis account of smallagency theory (Klein et al., 2004), if would-be participants in a boycott call perceive
themselves too small to make a difference they may become reluctant to boycott (Klein et al.,
2004), particularly when the costs of an anti-consumption effort in the form of boycotting
outweigh its benefits (John & Klein, 2003).
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The current paper agrees with prior literature but also contributes additional
arguments asserting that SAR can also be observed from a different perspective, new to
boycott participation literature. Specifically, when consumers face numerous boycott calls
from various organizations, most of them may seem important, equally desirable to support,
and hard to trade-off (Xu et al., 2013). In such circumstances, one may realize that s/he has
limited resources to support all calls (that deserve being supported), and thus, may feel too
small to make a difference.
Perceived low self-efficacy may decrease perceptions of control over external events
due to one’s limited behavioral control (Ajzen, 2002). Self-efficacy refers to an individuals’
confidence in their aptitude to influence events that may have an impact on their life and
control over how these events happen (Bandura, 1997). Thus, self-efficacy is focused on
being able to do things and control outcomes (Gifford, 2011). In the case of supporting a
boycott call, realizing that one is unable to help most people in need, may decrease his or her
perceptions of personal control and influence on events, and thus, self-efficacy. Lack of selfefficacy will increase perceptions of personal incompetence and insignificance, instigating a
sense of frustration, which then may cause an individual to make no choice at all, when faced
with the decision of supporting a boycott call. Such inaction may stem from the realization
that helping one party may not help others, and thus, people may believe that they are not
capable of “doing the right thing” or choosing the few correct calls to support. Thus,
exposing participants to multiple boycott calls may highlight the fact that life is full of people
in need, many of whom cannot be helped. Participants may then accept inequity and negative
incidents as commonplace and unavoidable.
Combined, these realizations may lead to SAR, which comprises two dimensions.
First, in line with prior literature, people may perceive themselves powerless as they believe
they are too small to affect external events. Second, people may perceive these uncontrollable
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events as inevitable, and thus, accept general inequities in life. Furthermore, the number of
boycott calls requesting support will increase the salience of the small-agency rationalization;
that is, the salience of the belief as to whether a person feels too small to make a difference or
not. Hence,
H2: Compared with individuals exposed to a few boycott calls, individuals exposed to
many boycott calls are more likely to experience the SAR, and thus, are less likely to
sign the petition to support a boycott call.

Overview of studies
We test our hypotheses in two online experiments. Study 1 provides initial supporting
evidence for the first hypothesis. We compare the percentage of participants who accepted
signing a petition to support a boycott call when there was a set of 15 boycott calls versus
when there was a set of three boycott calls (Haynes, 2009). More importantly, while aiming
to replicate Study 1’s results, Study 2 also demonstrates the underlying mechanism behind
this process by investigating the mediating role of SAR, while ruling out alternative
explanations. Further, Study 2 attempts to rule out the possible confounding effects of
information overload, and controls for other factors, such as perceived success likelihood,
trustworthiness of boycott calls, equity issue, perceived behavioral control, and brand
familiarity. Finally, a post-test was conducted to address further concerns about the potential
confounding effect of information overload.

Study 1
Study 1 aimed to test our prediction that people who are exposed to many boycott
calls will be less likely to sign a petition to support a boycott than others who are exposed to
only a few boycott calls. Specifically, a large choice-set of boycott calls comprises 15 brands
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and a small choice-set of boycott calls comprises three brands, which are randomly drawn
from the 15 brands in the large choice-set. The use of three and 15 as representatives of small
choice-sets and large choice-sets is consistent with previous studies in choice overload
literature (Haynes, 2009; Sela, Berger, & Liu, 2009).
We followed Morales, Amir, and Lee’s (2017) suggestion to employ realistic
experimental designs and measure actual behaviors. The authors recommend researchers to
“… have participants engage in a behavior that is a proxy for the underlying construct,…
have participants sign a petition instead of rating their level of agreement/disagreement with a
certain policy.” (p. 471). Accordingly, we attempted to increase the realism of our
experiments by measuring a behavioral dependent variable. “A behavior carries some
consequence that extends beyond indicating one’s thoughts about a given matter (Morales et
al., 2017, p. 470). In our specific context, the ‘consequence’ for participants’ behavior was
the effort or the ‘cost’ of explaining why they decided to sign a petition. To avoid demand
effects, in the questionnaire we were clear that skipping this response would not affect
participants’ compensation.
Method
Sample. A between-subjects experimental design was used. The experiment was
conducted online and participants were recruited from Amazon M-Turk (n = 313; Mage =
37.5, SD = 11.5, range 18-80 years; 181 females, 126 males, 6 missing information).
Participants are US residents; they completed a survey for a small monetary compensation.
12.5% of participants were undergraduate students, 15.7% were postgraduate students, 70.0%
were non-students, and 1.9% provided no information regarding their occupation. Regarding
their annual combined household income, the three most frequently reported brackets were
the ‘less than $30,000’ (17.6%), the ‘$100,000 or more’ (16.7%), and the ‘$30,000 – 39,999’
(13.4%). By random assignment, 161 participants saw the boycott calls for three brands (i.e.,
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small choice-set condition) and 152 participants saw the boycott calls for 15 brands (i.e.,
large choice-set condition).
Procedure. Participants were first introduced to the general topic of the study, namely,
boycotting. To ensure that all participants understood the term correctly, a definition of
consumer boycotts was provided: “Boycotts occur when consumers stop buying or using a
company’s products or services, because the company has done something wrong or
unethical. As boycotts directly threaten sales and revenues, they are taken seriously by
businesses. Any concerned group or individual can call a boycott.” They were then told that
they were about to see a list of calls for boycotts. They were informed that the list was not in
any particular order. To increase relevance, they were told that the boycott calls were
solicited from their local newspaper. This information was aimed to increase participants’
motivation to take part in the study and to ensure that findings were not confounded with
participants’ low motivation.
The boycott calls and the associated brands are real and were selected from the
Ethical Consumer’s website (www.ethicalconsumer.org). Ethical Consumer is a leading
alternative consumer organization, uncovering the truth behind the brands and supporting the
growth of the ethical market since 1987. In the set of boycott calls, each call targets one
brand, and the description consists of the category (e.g., animal rights, political, human
rights, etc.), the organization calling for the boycott, and the reason for boycott. Below is an
example of a boycott call targeted at Adidas (for a complete list, see Appendix 1).
Adidas
Category: Animal Rights
Called by: Viva
Boycott call from Viva for using kangaroo skin to make some types of football boots.
Adidas is phasing out the use of kangaroo leather by 98 percent over 12 months but
will still use small amounts of it so the boycott continues.
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For participants in the small choice-set condition, three brands were randomly and
evenly selected from the list of 15 brands that participants in the large choice-set condition
saw. After reading the information about the boycott calls in the assigned choice-set,
participants were asked questions about their perceptions of the size of the assigned choiceset, support for a boycott call, and demographics information. Some choice overload studies
(e.g., Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, & Kleber, 2010; Townsend & Kahn, 2014) measure
dependent variables after the manipulation checks. While it is reasonable to assume that
measuring perceptions of overload before dependent variables (e.g., satisfaction, choice
deferral) may influence judgements regarding the dependent variables (Schwarz & Clore,
1983), researchers Diehl and Poynor (2010) found that the order of these questions (i.e.,
measuring perceptions of overload either before or after DV measures) did not result in such
confounding effects.
Measures. To check whether the choice-set size manipulation was confirmed,
participants were asked two questions (adapted from Hadar & Sood, 2014): “How much
choice do you feel you were offered in terms of the number of boycott calls” (1 = not enough
choices, 7 = a lot of choices), “When initially given the task to pick one brand or organization
to boycott from the choice-set, what did you think about the choice-set size? (1 = I had too
few options to choose from, 7 = I had too many options to choose from).
To measure participants’ support for boycott, a real behavioral measure of signing the
petition to support a boycott call was used (Morales et al., 2017). Specifically, after reading
the information from the assigned list of brands to be boycotted, participants were presented
an open-ended question: “If you agree to sign a petition against one of the brands or
organizations that you just read about, please write below “Yes” and explain in a sentence
why. This will automatically be stored in the change.org website. If you are not willing to
sign the petition, then you can skip this question.” If participants responded to the question by

13

typing “Yes” and explaining the reason, their responses were coded as 1. If participants
skipped this question, their responses were coded as 0.
To measure participants’ motivation, participants were asked: “How motivated were
you in doing this survey?” (1 = not at all motivated, 7 = completely motivated).
Results
Manipulation check. Manipulation check questions (r = .620) confirmed the success
of the choice-set size manipulation, such that participants in the large choice-set condition
perceived their choice-set as larger than the participants in the small choice-set condition (M
= 5.48, SD = 1.30 vs. M = 3.42, SD = 1.29, t = −14.075, p < .001). There was also strong
evidence that participants did report a high level of motivation while completing the survey
(M = 5.42 vs. test value = 4 (midpoint in the 7-point scale), SD = .855, t = 51.236, p < .001).
The effect of choice-set size on motivation was not significant (F(1, 311) = .197, p = .658).
Hypothesis testing. To test Hypothesis 1, a chi-square test was used. Results revealed
that the number of participants choosing from the large choice-set condition who signed the
petition (28.3%) was less than the number of participants choosing from the small choice-set
condition (39.8%, χ2 (1, n = 313) = 4.566, p = .033, Φ = –.121). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was
supported.
Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 provided preliminary support for our first hypothesis that being exposed to
too many (vs. a few) boycott calls makes people less likely to sign a petition to support a
boycott. However, a question remains unanswered: Is it the amount of information or the
number of choices which drives the effect? Indeed, participants may have been affected by
information overload rather than by choice overload. This would mean that the difference
between the amount of information and not the number of choices might account for the
difference in the percentage of participants who were willing to sign a petition to support a
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boycott in each choice-set condition. More importantly, the central question as to why being
exposed to too many calls prevent people from signing a petition remained unanswered.
Further, Study 1 did not control for potential confounding factors (covariates). All of these
issues were addressed in Study 2.

Study 2
The first aim of Study 2 was to rule out the possibility of information overload (e.g.,
Jacoby, 1984) and not choice overload leading to fewer participants in the large (vs. small)
choice set signing petitions. Information overload may be caused by the amount of
information in the description of the boycott calls, which participants in the large choice-set
condition had to process. Clearly, information overload is different than choice overload as it
may be a result of a lot of information but not a lot of options (choices). To address this
concern, Study 2 noticeably reduced the amount of information in the description of each
boycott call (see the method section below). Second, Study 2 aims to build on Study 1 by not
only replicating Study 1’s results, but also demonstrating the underlying mechanism behind
this effect by exploring the mediating role of SAR. The indirect effect of SAR was examined
together with other alternative explanations of choice overload effects such as regret (Inbar,
Botti, & Hanko, 2011), choice difficulty (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), and feeling overwhelmed
(Diehl & Poynor, 2010) by measuring these constructs and checking their mediating effects.
Third, Study 2 aims to control for some other factors, such as perceived success
likelihood (Sen et al., 2001), trustworthiness of boycott calls, equity issue, perceived
behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991), and brand familiarity. The need for controlling these factors
emerged for the following reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume that people who see many
boycott calls might develop some doubts regarding the effectiveness and success of these
boycotts or whether all these calls are indeed reliable and believable. Hence, we controlled
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for trustworthiness. Second, exposure to too many boycott calls may lead people to be
concerned about their own perceived unjust behavior (i.e., alertness to personal inequity)
when they boycott only one brand out of many. This is different than the “acceptance of
general inequity in life” dimension in the SAR scale, which is about accepting the reality that
the world is full of injustice. Third, we also controlled for perceived behavioral control
(Ajzen, 1991), which reflects people’s perception of their control over the occurrence or
outcome of a situation. This is different from the powerlessness dimension of the SAR scale,
which represents people’s perception of their capability to carry out an action (e.g.,
boycotting a brand) to make a change (John & Klein, 2003; Klein et al., 2004). Finally, as our
experiment uses well-known brands, we measured brand familiarity with target brands and
use them as a covariate in the analysis to control potential confounding effects.
Method
Sample. Study 2 was a two-group (choice-set size: small, large) between-subjects
factorial design. Participants in the online experiment were recruited from Amazon M-Turk
(n = 228; Mage = 35.57, SD = 11.41, range 19-68 years; 119 females, 105 males, 4 missing
information). Participants are US residents; they completed a survey for a small monetary
compensation. 24.6% of the participants were undergraduate students, 14.9% were
postgraduate students, 57.5% were non-students, and 3.1% did not provide information about
their occupation. Regarding their annual combined household income, the three most
frequently reported brackets were the ‘less than $30,000’ (19.2%), the ‘$50,000 - $59,999’
(19.2%) and the ‘$30,000 – 39,999’ (12.3%). By random assignment, 114 participants saw
the boycott calls for three brands (i.e., small choice-set condition) and 114 participants saw
the boycott calls for 15 brands (i.e., large choice-set condition).
Procedure. The procedure of introducing the general topic of the questionnaire and
the list of calls for boycotts was the same as in Study 1. However, to remove the confounding

16

effect of information overload, the information explaining the boycott calls is reduced from a
paragraph (as in Appendix 1) to a sentence (see Appendix 2). We also removed the categories
of the causes because previous studies (Mogilner, Rudnick, & Iyengar, 2008) found that
having a mere presence of categories could alleviate the negative effect of an extensive
choice-set. Below is an example of a boycott call targeted at Adidas (for a complete list, see
Appendix 2).

Adidas
Boycott Adidas for using kangaroo skin to make football boots.

A separate post-test was conducted to address concerns that the amount of
information in the large choice-set condition was still objectively more than that in the small
choice-set condition. Following Baskin, Wakslak, Trope and Novemsky’s (2014) approach,
we ran a post-test using a student sample. (n = 120, Mage = 21.9, SD = 4.79, 77.5% female,
nLargeChoiceSet = 60, nSmallChoiceSet = 60) at a large Australian university. Students were asked to
read the information on boycott calls and, by randomization, they either received a small
choice-set with three boycott calls or a large choice-set with 15 boycott calls, same as in the
main study. We measured perceived information overload by asking two questions on a 7point scale: “How would you perceive the information you’ve just read?” (1 = Not a lot of
information, 7 = Too much information); “The information regarding calls to boycott
different brands is…” (1 = Not a lot, 7 = A lot). Results from a one-way ANOVA revealed
that participants in the large choice-set (M = 4.35, SD = 1.10) perceived that the amount of
information not significantly more than did participants in the small choice-set (M = 4.00, SD
= 1.19, F(1, 118) = 2.795, p = .097). We also measured the time (seconds) participants spent
in reading the given information. Results revealed that there were no significant differences
in reading time between participants in the large choice-set (M = 81.45, SD = 84.81) and
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those in the small choice-set (M = 73.76, SD = 172.01, F(1, 118) = .097, p = .757). Thus,
based on the empirical evidence, it could be concluded that information overload could be
ruled out as a confounding factor.
In Study 2, after reading the information about the brands in the assigned choice-set,
participants were asked questions about their perceptions of the size of the assigned choiceset, support for a boycott call, SAR, other factors, which could have functioned as alternative
explanations and control variables causing the effect as mentioned earlier, and demographics
information.
Measures. Measures of the choice-set size manipulation checks and the behavioral
measure of signing the petition to support a boycott call were as in Study 1.
Our theorization of SAR suggests that this factor has two components: powerlessness
and acceptance of inequity in life. We asked participants to indicate their agreement on a 7point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) for seven statements, which
comprise items of the SAR scale: (1) I alone cannot help to make the world a better and safer
place, (2) I alone cannot act on all of these important issues, (3) I feel like I am incapable of
making a positive change on this planet, (4) This is life, I cannot save the affected by
boycotting only one brand or organization, (5) After reading about these brands, I feel like
life is unfair overall, (6) After reading about these brands, I feel like there is no justice
overall, and (7) After reading about these brands, I feel like the world lacks equality overall.
The first four factors measured powerlessness, and the last three factors measured acceptance
of inequity in life.
To measure perceived regret, we asked participants to indicate their perceived regret
for their decision on a 7-point scale: “Given you cannot change your mind now, do you regret
your choice?” (1 = No regret at all, 7 = Very much regret); “Do you think that another brand
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from the list would have been better to be boycotted than the brand you chose?” (1 =
Definitely not, 7 = Definitely yes).
To measure choice difficulty, we asked: “How easy or difficult was it for you to
choose a brand or organization to boycott?” (7-point scale, 1 = Very easy, 7 = Very difficult).
To measure feeling overwhelmed, we asked participants the following question on a
7-point scale: “How overwhelmed were you when looking at these boycott calls?” (1 = Not
overwhelmed at all, 7 = Very overwhelmed).
To measure perceived success likelihood of the boycott calls (adapted from Sen et al.,
2001), we asked participants to indicate their agreements on a 7-point Likert scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) for two statements: “Boycotting these brands is an
effective way to make them act responsibly,” and “I am confident that boycotting these
brands will ensure that they become responsible for their actions” (r = .692).
To measure the boycott calls’ trustworthiness, adapted from Albrecht, Campbell,
Heinrich and Lammel (2013), we asked participants to indicate on a 7-point scale the extent
to which they find the boycott calls unbelievable/believable, untrustworthy/ trustworthy, not
convincing/ convincing, not credible/ credible, unreasonable/ reasonable, dishonest/ honest,
questionable/ unquestionable, inconclusive/ conclusive, not authentic/ authentic, and
unlikely/ likely (α = .958).
To measure the extent to which participants focused on the equity issue of choosing
only one brand to boycott (alertness to personal inequity), we asked two questions on a 7point scale (r = .605): “To what extent do you find it is unfair if you can only select one
brand to boycott?” (7-point scale, 1 = not at all unfair, 7 = very unfair), and “Is there an
equity issue if you can only select one brand to boycott?” (7-point scale, 1 = no equity issue
at all, 7 = yes, very much).
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Adapting from Fielding, McDonald, and Louis (2008), we measured perceived
behavioral control, asking participants the following five questions (α = .834) on the 7-point
scale: “How much control do you have over whether you engage in boycotting these
brands?” (1 = very little control, 7 = a great deal of control), “For me to engage in boycotting
these brands is…” (1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), “If I wanted to, I could easily engage in
boycotting these brands.” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), “It is mostly up to me
whether I engage in boycotting these brands.” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), and
“How difficult would it be for you to engage in boycotting these brands?” (1 = very difficult,
7 = very easy).
Finally, to measure brand familiarity, participants were asked two questions on a 7point scale (r = .776): “How familiar are you with the brands and organizations included in
the list for boycotting?” (1 = not at all familiar, 7 = very familiar), “How well do you know
the brands and organizations included in the list for boycotting? (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much).
Results
Manipulation check. Manipulation check questions (r = .742) confirmed the success
of the choice-set size manipulation, such that participants in the large choice-set condition (M
= 5.36, SD = 1.48) perceived their choice-set as larger than the participants in the small
choice-set condition (M = 3.08, SD = 1.54, t = −11.377, p < .001).
Reliability and validity. Given the novelty of the SAR scale, we investigated the
reliability and validity of the scale. First, the coefficient alpha for the whole scale is .781. For
powerlessness items (items 1-4), the Cronbach’s alpha is .709. For acceptance of inequity in
life (items 5-7), the Cronbach’s alpha is .862. Second, a principle component analysis (PCA)
followed by Varimax rotation was conducted. The PCA produced a two-component solution,
based on the following criteria: “eigenvalue (>1), scree plot (retain all components within the
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sharp descent), loading score for each factor (≥ 0.40), and meaningfulness of each dimension
(Aaker, 1997; Nunnally, 1978)” (cited in Sung, Choi, Ahn, & Song, 2015, p. 126). There was
evidence of convergent validity as factor loadings were greater than .5 after Varimax rotation.
As these measurement items converged on to the original proposed factors, there was
evidence of good construct validity (Kaiser & Rice, 1974).
Third, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in AMOS 25.0. The data
did fit the model, based on multiple goodness-of-fit indices: (1) the chi-square statistic was
significant (χ2 = 25.811, df = 13, p = .018) but the χ2/df ratio was 1.985, smaller than 3, (2)
CFI (.975), GFI (.971), NFI (.952), and IFI (.975) were higher than 0.90, (3) RMSEA was
.066. In support of convergent validity, the loadings on the factors were significant (p <
.001). All the factor loadings were > .5. We examined the discriminant validity using the
Fornell and Larcker (1981) technique: using the square root of AVE of each construct is
greater than the correlation of the specific construct with the other construct.
We also compared different models: a single-factor model in which all 7 items
explained one latent construct (Model A), a 2-factor model (Model B), a 2-factor model with
one higher order factor (Model C). Results revealed that Model A did not fit well (e.g., χ2/df
ratio was 9.393, larger than 3; CFI = .771, IFI = .774, RMSEA = .192), and Models B & C
have identical fit indices (because there are only two first-order factors). The abovementioned results provide empirical supports that the SAR construct is effectively measured,
with two dimensions: powerlessness and acceptance of inequity in life.
Hypothesis testing. To test Hypothesis 1, a chi-square test was used. Results revealed
that the number of participants choosing from the large choice-set condition who signed the
petition (37.7%) was less than the number of participants choosing from the small choice-set
condition who signed the petition (51.8%, χ2 (1, n = 228) = 4.542, p = .033, Φ = –.141).
Thus, Hypothesis 1 was again supported.
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Mediation analysis. To examine whether SAR (mediator) explained the effect of
choice-set size (independent variable) on signing a petition to support a boycott call
(dependent variable), a series of regressions and 10,000 bootstrap resamples using the
PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 4; Hayes, 2013), as recommended by Zhao, Lynch, and
Chen (2010), were performed. Five covariates included in the model were: perceived success
likelihood, trustworthiness of boycott calls, equity issue (i.e., alertness to personal inequity),
perceived behavioral control, and brand familiarity. Other competing mechanisms were
regret, choice difficulty, and feeling overwhelmed.
Results revealed that the indirect effect of choice-set size on signing a petition
through SAR was significant (β = –.0618, SE = .0490, 95% CI = [–.1921, –.0019]).
Importantly, the indirect effects of choice-set size through regret (β = .0057, SE = .0280, 95%
CI = [–.0419, .0797]), choice difficulty (β = –.0055, SE = .0220, 95% CI = [–.0716, .0243]),
and feeling overwhelmed (β = .0240, SE = .0673, 95% CI = [–.1044, .1660]) were not
significant.
When these alternative explanations were removed, the indirect effect of choice-set
size through SAR remained significant (β = –.0610, SE = .0476, 95% CI = [–.1931, –.0031]).
When all alternative explanations and covariates were removed, the indirect effect of choiceset size through SAR also remained significant (β = –.0774, SE = .0449, 95% CI = [–.1902, –
.0150]) while the direct effect of choice-set size became insignificant (Cohen's d = –.2213,
SE = .1384, p = .110, 95% CI = [–.4926, .0499]). When the covariates were removed but the
alternative mechanisms were still included in the mediation model, results revealed that only
the indirect effect of choice-set size on signing a petition through SAR was significant (β = –
.0821, SE = .0477, 95% CI = [–.2014, –.0154]) while the indirect effects of choice-set size
through regret (β = .0236, SE = .0343, 95% CI = [–.0314, .1109]), choice difficulty (β = –
.0299, SE = .0332, 95% CI = [–.1170, .0216]), and feeling overwhelmed (β = .0852, SE =
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.0696, 95% CI = [–.0337, .2428]) and the direct effect of choice-set size (Cohen's d = –.3039,
SE = .1502, p = .0430, 95% CI = [–.5982, –.0095]) were significant.
Thus, there was supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2 such that SAR mediated the
effect of choice-set size on signing a petition. Figure 1 and Table 1 summarize relevant
regression analyses between constructs.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
(Insert Table 1 here)
Discussion of Study 2
While controlling for the potential confounding effect of information overload, Study
2 replicated Study 1’s results such that participants were less likely to sign a petition to
support a boycott if they are exposed to too many (vs. a few) boycott calls. More importantly,
this effect was driven by the mediation effect of SAR. Thus, when being exposed to a large
(vs. small) choice-set of boycott calls, participants were more likely to feel small such that
they felt the sense of being powerless and also accepted unfairness in the world, which led to
their unwillingness to sign a petition.
Table 1 provided further insights regarding the effects of the covariates. Results
revealed that perceived behavioral control, brand familiarity, and trustworthiness of boycott
calls (ps > .6) did not influence whether participants experienced being a small-agent. Yet,
the feeling of small-agency is negatively affected by perceived success likelihood (p = .001)
and positively affected by perceptions of personal equity issue (p = .007). These findings
support our theoretical arguments regarding SAR. Specifically, as perceptions of boycott
success likelihood increase, feelings of small-agency decrease. Conversely, when individuals
believe there is an equity issue when supporting only one boycott, feelings of small-agency
increase. Regarding the likelihood to sign a petition to support a boycott, results revealed that
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perceived success likelihood, equity issue, perceived behavioral control, and brand familiarity
did not have significant effects (ps > .2). Yet, only when participants perceived the boycott
calls to be trustworthy, they were more likely to sign a petition (p < .001).
Results of the post-test addressing information overload concerns confirm that
participants devoted a similar amount of time into both high and low information conditions,
which suggests that people only have a certain amount of time and cognitive resources they
are willing to devote to various issues. Thus, when faced with more information, most people
still devote approximately the same amount of effort (e.g., time) as in low information
scenarios. In any case, based on the empirical evidence, we show that we have ruled out
information overload as an alternative account for our research findings. Essentially,
participants (and people in the real world) bypass information overload by refusing to devote
anymore cognitive and time resources, therefore information overload does not occur.

General Discussion and Conclusion
Organizations and people asking consumers to sign a petition against transgressing
brands has become commonplace for consumers on social media every day. Yet, marketing
and consumer behavior literature has not paid attention to the rising popularity of consumers
signing online petitions. Thus, literature on this trend is limited. Exploring the impact of
choice overload on consumers signing a petition in support of a boycott call, this study
establishes that individuals who need to make a choice from numerous boycott calls (i.e.,
large choice-sets) are less likely to sign a petition to support the boycott call than those who
need to make a choice from a small number of boycott calls.
The findings also support a theoretical rationale explaining this effect. Compared with
individuals facing fewer boycott calls, those facing numerous boycott calls are more likely to
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experience the SAR, and thus, are less likely to sign the petition. Unlike the small-agent
phenomenon in prior literature that only focuses on one’s inability to compete against large
companies, the SAR we established in this research additionally refers to one’s acceptance of
inequity in the world, and thus, one’s inability to help everyone in need. Being ‘small,’ and
therefore, inept and ineffective against big players (i.e., organizations) in the marketplace
decreases likelihood to boycott (Klein et al., 2004). This study offers choice-set size as a
novel antecedent that leads to SAR. Specifically, this study establishes that being exposed to
too many boycott calls will increase the salience of many important events that one cannot
support simultaneously, due to limited personal capacity.
Credibility and trustworthiness of the source and content of information on persuasion
is well established (Balabanis & Chatzopoulou, 2019). The more reputable or expert a
spokesperson or an organization and the higher the consumer perceptions of the accuracy and
reliability of the information provided, the more persuasive the message becomes (Metzger &
Flanagin, 2013; Ohanian, 1990; Rieh, 2002). Sen et al. (2001) support this view by stating the
necessity of the source credibility regarding the boycott organizers or boycott messages to be
investigated in further boycott studies. Following their call, we measured the effect of source
credibility (Albrecht et al., 2013) on boycott support and found that it has a significant effect
as expected.

Theoretical contributions
This study contributes to anti-consumption (e.g., Chatzidakis & Lee, 2013) and
boycott literature (e.g., Hoffmann, 2011; Yuksel & Mryteza, 2009) by introducing a new
antecedent that influences anti-consumption related decisions (Lee, Fernandez, & Hyman,
2009; Yuksel, 2013); namely, the effect of many versus few boycott calls. This is the first
study establishing that the number of requests asking for anti-consumption will influence
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consumers’ decisions to support a boycott call or to do nothing. By the same token, this study
also adds directly to the boycott literature a new outcome variable (dependent variable),
which not only measures attitudes but also actual behavior. Consequently, this study
increases the realism of experimental research (Morales et al., 2017). In our studies,
participants were asked whether they would agree to sign a petition against one of the brands
listed on a boycott website. Participants were told that they need to select one out of the two
decisions. They were told that they either choose “Yes” as a response to the question relating
to boycott support, or, alternatively, they could choose to skip the question, should they
decide not to support the boycott. Specifically, participants read the following requirement.
“If you agree to sign a petition against one of the brands/organizations that you just read,
please write below “Yes” and explain in a sentence why. This will automatically be stored in
the change.org website. If you are not willing to sign the petition, then skip this question.”
Thus, the dependent variable used in this study measured actual boycott behavior in terms of
signing an online petition. More importantly, the introduction of a new antecedent to boycott
likelihood; that is, the number of calls to which consumers are exposed to, expands boycott
literature. The study establishes that the greater the number of boycott calls consumers
receive, the less they will participate in boycotts. Indeed, given there are so many calls on the
Internet and social media that ask customers to sign a petition, it is very important for boycott
organizers or initiators of petitions to know whether the number of current calls will have an
impact on their targets.
Likewise, this study contributes to choice overload literature (e.g., Papadopoulou,
Raïes, Mir Bernal, & Woodside, 2019) by introducing a new outcome variable; namely, a
decision to support boycotts by signing a petition when faced with numerous versus limited
options. Indeed, while on the surface it may seem that we have simply replicated prior
research on choice overload, we actually contribute to the literature in three ways. First, the
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context is novel and looks at the effect of choice overload on anti-consumption rather than
consumption. Second, at the theoretical level, the introduction of SAR explains inaction in
the boycotting context that may not apply to regular consumption contexts. Third, from a
conceptual perspective, boycotting is a different construct from non-choice. The decision not
to boycott has more dire consequences, since refusing to boycott a business in the face of the
information about the egregious company may be accompanied by a greater variety of
negative feelings. Prior research on choice overload (Chernev et al., 2015) suggests that nonchoice/inaction enables people to avoid post purchase regret and does not lead to
psychological repercussions such as feelings of guilt, being unethical, irresponsible,
powerless, and so forth. In contrast, our research on boycott overload suggests the opposite,
where inaction may be accompanied by those very same negative feelings. In conventional
cases of choice overload, usually relating to purchase decisions, consumers who are faced
with too many purchase options, feel a sense of regret (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd,
2010) or dissatisfaction with their decision (Haynes, 2009; Thai & Yuksel, 2017). In some
cases, they may even decide to forego a purchase (Chernev et al., 2015). However, the
current research extends this literature by demonstrating that choice overload, in the context
of anti-consumption (via boycotting), can also cause people to accept inequity in the world,
which then prevents them from acting on moral decisions. Therefore, the effect of choice
overload, in terms of deciding whether to practice anti-consumption or not, is more critical
than choice overload in purchase/consumption decisions. The reason being that, whilst choice
overload has a negative impact on consumer decision making, it does not evoke the same
sense of powerlessness, which choice overload can have in cases of anti-consumption.
Classic small-agent conceptualization (John & Klein, 2003) that relates to being weak
and powerless in the presence of the strong and powerful, only partially explains the severe
effect of choice overload in anti-consumption calls. The current study extends the theory
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further by proposing the concept of SAR, which is a more complex phenomenon than the
small-agent concept covered in prior literature and economics (Orland & Selten, 2016; Tyran
& Engelmann, 2005).
In the present study, people facing many requests to practice anti-consumption not
only perceive themselves “too small” to make a difference (John & Klein, 2003), and thus,
feel ineffective and inept to “do the right thing”, but also, they align this lack of self-efficacy
with a perception of the world being inherently inequitable. Thus, the current research
augments small-agency concept as it contributes an additional dimension: acceptance of
general inequity in life. This amplification makes the small-agency conceptually and
empirically different from the small-agent theory in economics and prior work that relates to
a rational analysis of costs versus benefits or to imperfect competition (Crawford, Pavanini,
& Schivardi, 2018). For example, John and Klein (2003) state that after weighing costs
against benefits, if people realize that the cost of participation may outweigh the benefits
gained, people may decide not to boycott. This is because their contribution may not be big
enough to change “one” important boycott call, which is bigger than their self. Yet, this effect
is eliminated once people believe that the boycott will be successful (John & Klein, 2003).
However, in our current conceptualization, even if the boycott a person participates in is
expected to be successful, there remains many other calls worth boycotting, with which the
individual cannot help. Thus, in the context of anti-consumption, the small-agent
rationalization is further associated with accepting unfairness and inequity in the world.
Ironically, as social media and the Internet open channels for putting forth a plethora of
boycott calls, more consumers may start to tolerate unfairness and inequality, as they notice
their inability to help all charity organizations that are facing various tragedies. In addition to
the conceptualization of SAR, the current research also empirically measures this new
construct, using a 7-item scale, not developed and empirically tested before (see Method
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section for details). The two-dimensional SAR scale has two components : powerlessness and
acceptance of inequity in life. Thus, the current work expands the construct of small-agency
beyond the original cost-benefit perspective (Klein et al., 2004).

Managerial and policy implications
In terms of managerial and practical implications, this study provides boycott
organizers as well as policy makers with information on how to manage successful boycott
calls and increase signatures for online petitions. While it seems exciting for an organization
to list all current boycott calls in order to attract more potential supporters, the findings here
suggest that people are actually less likely to sign a petition ––which is what really matters
for the organization–– when people see too many boycott calls. Boycott organizers, therefore,
should be selective in terms of choosing which brand they prioritize to be boycotted. A
timeline that partitions different boycott campaigns to be promoted at different periods is
recommended as participants may perceive such an approach as less overwhelming. People
may then be less likely to perceive themselves as “too small” to make a difference, or even
worse, come to accept inequity in the world. Practically speaking, findings from this study
suggest that social media channels, where people share their support for a campaign or make
an announcement that they are boycotting a specific brand, should consider modifying their
algorithms so that users will not see too many boycott calls on their News Feed at a time.
Another managerial implication relates to some ethical concerns regarding the
genuineness of the boycott calls and organizers. Along this present study, we introduce
boycott calls as a legitimate consumer action and present information to help increase the
marketing effectiveness of organizations proposing those boycotts. Although boycotts
motivate consumers by instilling a sense of consumer empowerment (Gonçalves, Silva, &
Martins, 2018), this empowerment may sometimes be distorted and misused by consumers,
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boycott organizers, or competing brands. Thus, trustworthiness of the source is included as a
covariate in Study 2. Several unjust anti-consumption practices may stem from consumers
following a boycott call that is unreal, unfair, or exaggerated with the adverse purpose of
damaging a brand. Such smear campaigns are quite easy to facilitate and may have fast,
widespread effects in the current era of fake news and post-truth, expediated by the new
mechanisms of neo-liberalism. In such cases, boycott targeted brands should be equipped
with sound armaments to strategically respond to such boycott calls (Dutta & Pullig, 2011;
Yuksel & Mryteza, 2009). Indeed, boycott research details strategic actions to be followed by
boycott targeted firms to avoid or diminish the negative effects of boycott calls (see Yuksel &
Mryteza, 2009 for detailed discussion on four different strategic responses boycott targeted
companies follow).

Limitations and further research
This study is not immune to some limitations. Although the study establishes that
choice overload occurs when people encounter too many boycott calls, there may be
boundary conditions on this effect, which this study did not investigate. For instance, the
effect of brand familiarity on SAR warrants further investigation, despite brand familiarity
not having a subsequent effect on boycott support. Nonetheless, the effects of choice
overload on unfamiliar brands is ripe for investigation. Additionally, whilst this current study
establishes that SAR is the underlying process explaining the effect of choice-set size on
boycott support decisions, there remain factors that may affect one’s perceptions of SAR,
such as personality traits and culture, which were beyond the scope of this study, and thus,
not investigated. Further studies may delve into dynamics that may influence one’s sense of
self and self-efficacy, which may then affect one’s SAR.
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Furthermore, although assessing real behavior in experiments have many benefits,
this approach does have a limitation. For example, the measurement of boycott support by
asking participants to write “Yes” and explain their reasons as to why they agreed to support
the boycott (i.e., replicating how petition sites like Change.org work) may introduce some
social desirability bias resulting in demand effects among MTurk participants. Thus, further
studies may choose to employ field experiments to test the realism and external validity, thus
replicating the effects found in this research. This will also address the challenge caused by
measuring a real behavior in an online experiment. For example, future studies may create a
mock-up website, like the Ethical Consumer site referenced in this present research, and then
feature either a small or large choice-set of boycott calls to see if more people join a boycott
when a small (vs. large) choice-set of calls is displayed. Alternatively, further studies may
run field studies using clipboards to have individuals potentially sign a petition on the road.
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Table 1. Summary of regression analyses
Dependent variables
Independent variables and
covariates

Small-agent rationalization (SAR)
Β

Choice-set size
SAR
Regret
Choice difficulty
Feeling overwhelmed
Perceived success likelihood
Trustworthiness of boycott calls
Equity issue
Perceived behavioral control
Brand familiarity
Constant

.166
…
…
…
…
–.176
–.013
.115
–.032
.013
4.319

SE

.067
…
…
…
…
.051
.057
.042
.061
.058
.417
R2 = .123

Signing a petition to boycott

p

Β

.014
…
…
…
…
.001
.826
.007
.605
.828
.000

–.318
–.371
.023
–.138
.045
.084
.549
.131
.067
–.011
–2.398

SE

p

.163
.051
.166
.025
.093
.808
.111
.213
.109
.678
.121
.487
.138
.000
.103
.204
.147
.650
.138
.935
1.300
.065
Nagelkrk R2 =.276

F(6, 221) = 5.151
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Figure 1. Mediation Analysis
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Appendix 1: List of 15 boycott calls
Adidas

Category: Animal Rights
Called by: Viva
Boycott call from Viva for using kangaroo skin to make some types of
football boots. Adidas is phasing out the use of kangaroo leather by 98
percent over 12 months but will still use small amounts of it so the boycott
continues.
Category: Political
Ben & Jerry's
Called by: BDS Movement
Unilever subsidiary Ben & Jerry's has been added to the list of companies
boycotted by the BDS movement. The call comes from the brand's longstanding contractual relationship with an Israeli franchise that
manufactures ice cream in Israel and sells it in Israeli settlements in the
occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Cadbury
Category: Political
Called by: Methodist Tax Justice Network, SumOfUS
Campaign say they are boycotting Cadbury "until we see evidence that
Cadbury is paying tax commensurate with their sales in all countries in
which they operate, we will refuse to buy from a company who avoid
making their appropriate contributions to wider society."
Category: Human Rights
Driscoll's
Called by: Families United For Justice
(Sakuma
Thousands of farm-workers in the US and Mexico have called for a
Brand)
boycott of Driscoll's which sells Sakuma berries. Thousands of workers
went on strike for two weeks demanding higher wages and legally required
benefits. Independent union Families United for Justice are a representative
of the farm workers and demands Driscoll's to stop selling Sakuma berries.
Elsevier
Category: Politics
Called by: The Cost of Knowledge
Academics are boycotting Elsevier's journals due to the "exorbitantly high
prices for subscriptions to individuals and "in the light of these high prices,
the only realistic option for many libraries is to agree to buy very large
bundles, which will include many journals that those libraries do not
actually want. Elsevier thus makes huge profits by exploiting the fact that
some of their journals are essential."
FedEx
Category: Human Rights
Called by: Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska
(CTHITA)
CTHITA have called for a boycott of FedEx for as long as they continue to
sponsor the Washington Redskins - who bear a racially offensive name.
Hermès
Category: Animal Rights
Called by: PETA
PETA are calling on a boycott of Hermès which sells luxury bags and belts
using skin from reptiles. Alligators and crocodiles are brutally slaughtered
for 'luxury' fashion.
Intercontinental Category: Human rights
Hotels
Called by: freetibet.org
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Kellogg's

L'Oreal

Nestlé

Nike

Staples

Starbucks

Wendy's

Free Tibet and other international groups have launched a global boycott
targeting the Intercontinental Hotels Group (IHG), owner of Holiday Inn,
over its plan to open a hotel in Lhasa, the capital of occupied Tibet.
Category: Environment
Called by: Organic Consumers Association
For using sugar from genetically engineered sugar beets in its products. To
see how they rate and for alternatives see Ethical Consumer's free Buyers'
Guide to cereal.
Category: Animal Testing
Called by: Naturewatch
Naturewatch has a long-standing boycott of L'Oreal due to its continued
use of animal testing for cosmetics. The French multinational uses
ingredients that have been tested on animals, despite public statements to
the contrary. It has also been criticized for lobbying against an EU ban on
animal testing for cosmetics.
Category: Irresponsible Marketing
Called by: Baby Milk Action
Baby Milk Action has called a boycott of Nestle for its irresponsible
marketing of baby milk formula which infringes the International Code of
Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes. Also criticized for use of Palm Oil
and not labelling GM ingredients.
Category: Animal rights
Called by: Save The Kangaroo
Nike is subject to a boycott call for its use of Kangaroo leather.
Campaigners say that "the methods in which this skin is obtained however
are extremely cruel and involve killing both pregnant mothers and babies
in disturbing manners."
Category: Workers Rights
Called by: American Postal Workers Union
The American Postal Workers Union has called a boycott of Staples
following deal between the company and the post office which saw Staples
open post office branches in its stores. The union argues that these post
offices are staffed by lower paid workers with fewer rights than colleagues
doing the same jobs in traditional post offices.
Category: Worker Rights
Called by: Organic Consumer's Association
Starbucks is under a boycott call from the US Organic Consumer's
Association over its treatment of Ethiopian coffee farmers. Also heavily
criticized by Ethical Consumer over corporate tax avoidance.
Category: Human Rights
Called by: Coalition of Immokalee Workers
The boycott was called after Wendy's refused to join the Fair Food
Program (FFP). The FFO is a social responsibility program that addresses
decades-old farm labour abuses. All Wendy's major competitors such as
McDonald's, Burger King, Subway and Taco Bell have signed up. Those
that sign up agree to purchase exclusively from suppliers meeting the code
of conduct including a zero-tolerance policy for slavery and sexual
harassment.
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Appendix 2: List of 15 brands and why they should be boycotted (Study 2)
Adidas
Ben & Jerry's
Cadbury
Driscoll's
(Sakuma
Brand)
Elsevier

Boycott Adidas for using kangaroo skin to make football boots.
Boycott Ben & Jerry's for the brand's long-standing contractual relationship
with an Israeli franchise that manufactures ice cream in Israel and sells it in
Israel settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Boycott Cadbury for tax avoidance.
Boycott Driscoll for exploiting their workers.

Boycott Elsevier for exorbitantly high prices for subscriptions to academic
journals.
FedEx
Boycott FedEx for sponsoring the Washington Redskins who bear a racially
offensive name.
Hermès
Boycott Hermes for using skin from reptiles.
Intercontinental Boycott Intercontinental Hotels Group for opening a hotel in Lhasa, the capital
Hotels
of occupied Tibet.
Kellogg's
Boycott Kellogg's for using sugar from genetically engineered sugar beets in its
products.
L'Oreal
Boycott L'Oreal for its continued use of animal testing for cosmetics.
Nestlé
Boycott Nestle for its irresponsible marketing of baby milk formula which
infringes the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes.
Nike
Boycott Nike for its use of kangaroo leather.
Staples
Boycott Staples for opening post office branches in its stores with lower paid
workers compared with colleagues doing the same jobs in traditional post
offices.
Starbucks
Boycott Starbucks for its poor treatment of Ethiopian coffee farmers.
Wendy's
Boycott Wendy for refusing to join the Fair Food Program which addresses
decades-old farm labor abuses.
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